نظریه نگهبان اساس؛ از رهگذر انتقادات کارل اشمیت بر لیبرالیسم،
دموکراسی و
پارلمان گرایی (
مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
درجه
علمی:
نشریه علمی (وزارت علوم)
نویسندگان:
سید ناصر سلطانی کاظم احمدی
منبع:
پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال 27 پاییز 1404 شماره 88
حوزههای
تخصصی:
حوزههای تخصصی
حقوق حقوق عمومی
doi:
10.22054/qjpl.2024.79892.2999
شماره صفحات:
۱۹۵ - ۲۳۰
دریافت
مقاله
تعداد دانلود :
۱۵۲
آرشیو
آرشیو شمارهها:
۵۰
سال ۱۴۰۴ (۴)
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال 27 زمستان 1404 شماره 89
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال 27 پاییز 1404 شماره 88
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال 27 تابستان 1404 شماره 87
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال 27 بهار 1404 شماره 86
سال ۱۴۰۳ (۴)
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال 26 زمستان 1403 شماره 85
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال 26 پاییز 1403 شماره 84
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال 26 تابستان 1403 شماره 83
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال 26 بهار 1403 شماره 82
سال ۱۴۰۲ (۴)
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال 25 زمستان 1402 شماره 81
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال 25 پاییز 1402 شماره 80
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال 25 تابستان 1402 شماره 79
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال 25 بهار 1402 شماره 78
سال ۱۴۰۱ (۴)
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال بیست و چهارم زمستان 1401 شماره 77
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال بیست و چهارم پاییز 1401 شماره 76
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال بیست و چهارم تابستان 1401 شماره 75
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال بیست و چهارم بهار 1401 شماره 74
سال ۱۴۰۰ (۴)
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال بیست و سوم زمستان 1400 شماره 73
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال بیست و سوم پاییز 1400 شماره 72
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال بیست و سوم تابستان 1400 شماره 71
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال بیست و سوم بهار 1400 شماره 70
سال ۱۳۹۹ (۴)
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال بیست و دوم زمستان 1399 شماره 69
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال بیست و دوم پاییز 1399 شماره 68
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال بیست و دوم تابستان 1399 شماره 67
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال بیست و دوم بهار 1399 شماره 66
سال ۱۳۹۸ (۴)
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال بیست و یکم زمستان 1398 شماره 65
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال بیست و یکم پاییز 1398 شماره 64
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال بیست و یکم تابستان 1398 شماره 63
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال بیست و یکم بهار 1398 شماره 62
سال ۱۳۹۷ (۴)
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال بیستم زمستان 1397 شماره 61
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال بیستم پاییز 1397 شماره 60
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال بیستم تابستان 1397 شماره 59
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال نوزدهم بهار 1397 شماره 58
سال ۱۳۹۶ (۴)
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال نوزدهم زمستان 1396 شماره 57
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال نوزدهم پاییز 1396 شماره 56
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال نوزدهم تابستان 1396 شماره 55
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال هجدهم بهار 1396 شماره 54
سال ۱۳۹۵ (۴)
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال هجدهم زمستان 1395 شماره 53
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال هجدهم پاییز 1395 شماره 52
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال هجدهم تابستان 1395 شماره 51
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال هفدهم بهار 1395 شماره 50
سال ۱۳۹۴ (۴)
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال هفدهم زمستان 1394 شماره 49
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال هفدهم پاییز 1394 شماره 48
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال هفدهم تابستان 1394 شماره 47
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال شانزدهم بهار 1394 شماره 46
سال ۱۳۹۳ (۴)
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال شانزدهم زمستان 1393 شماره 45
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال شانزدهم پاییز 1393 شماره 44
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال شانزدهم تابستان 1393 شماره 43
- پژوهش حقوق عمومی سال شانزدهم بهار 1393 شماره 42
سال ۱۳۹۱ (۲)
- پژوهش حقوق سال چهاردهم تابستان 1391 شماره 37
- پژوهش حقوق سال چهاردهم بهار 1391 شماره 36
چکیده
اشمیت به شدت با رویکرد لیبرال به پاسداری از
قانون اساسی مخالف بود، رویکردی که او آن را عاری از محتوای
سیاسی واقعی و بیش از حد وابسته به
اصول حقوقی انتزاعی می دانست. او در عوض، از نقشی قاطع تر و با بار سیاسی بیشتر برای رئیس دولت طرفداری می کرد و
استدلال می نمود که تنها چنین فردی می تواند به طور مؤثر از قانون اساسی در زمان
بحران محافظت کند. او مفهوم لیبرال از دولت بی طرف و عینی را به چالش می کشد و ادعا می کند که چنین دولتی ذاتاً از اتخاذ تصمیمات سیاسی حیاتی برای پاسداری از قانون اساسی ناتوان است. او همچنین از دموکراسی لیبرال انتقاد می کند و استدلال می کند که این نوع دموکراسی منجر به فضایی سیاسی تکه تکه شده و غیرقاطع می شود و آن را در حفظ وحدت و انسجام دولت ناکارآمد می سازد. اشمیت استدلال می کند که قانون اساسی به عنوان تجسم
هویت دولت، صرفا با سازوکارهای حقوقی قابل محافظت نیست، بلکه نیازمند
اراده سیاسی قوی و قاطع است؛ اراده ای که بتواند در مواجهه با عدم قطعیت و بحران عمل کند. این مقاله با رویکردی
تحلیل محتوا به نقدهای کارل شمیت، نظریه پرداز برجسته حقوقِ آلمان، بر لیبرالیسم، دموکراسی و پارلمان گرایی در رابطه با پیامدهای آن ها بر حفاظت از قانون اساسی می پردازد.
The Guardian of the Constitution: Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism, Democracy, and Parliamentarianism
Introduction It has always been a challenge to determine the institution or authority responsible for safeguarding the highest legal and political expression of a society, namely its constitution. The significance of this issue lies in the critical role of protecting the foundation of society. The constitution, as the embodiment of a society’s political and social unity, preserves its identity and cohesion. Accordingly, every political community and legal system, shaped by its worldview and prevailing ideology, has devised a method to protect its constitution. After gaining independence, Americans entrusted the judiciary with the protection of the constitution, establishing it as the guardian institution. This model became a template for other socio-legal systems. Alongside the American or Anglo-Saxon approach, a new model emerged based on the ideas of Hans Kelsen, an Austrian jurist. Kelsen’s model advocates assigning constitutional protection to an institution independent of political authorities, yet operating with a judicial approach. The Constitutional Court, first established in Austria, would serve as the guardian of the constitution, functioning like a judicial court by adjudicating constitutional disputes and issuing judgments. In contrast, Carl Schmitt, with his keen perception of political realities and his observations of the crises of the Weimar Republic in Germany, proposed a different path. Schmitt’s ideas, shaped by his critique of liberalism in law and politics, have often been described as undemocratic, authoritarian, or power-oriented. His explicit opposition to parliamentarism linked him to fascism and the Nazi Party. Skeptical of liberal ideals rooted in parliamentarism, Schmitt argued that the parliament and its fragile foundations had lost their effectiveness and could no longer be relied upon. For Schmitt, safeguarding the foundation—the cohesive political and social unity of society—is primarily a political task. Liberalism, by reducing politics to debate and discussion on one hand and transforming it into economic competition on the other, was no longer capable of fulfilling this role. Liberal principles, including parliamentary regime, pluralism, and party systems, had lost their effectiveness in protecting the foundation and had instead become major dilemmas in the polity. In response, Schmitt advocated entrusting the guardianship of the foundation to the president, a political figure who could remain above the self-serving conflicts of parliament and parties, and exercise decisive authority when necessary to prevent the destruction of the foundation. The present study aimed to examine Schmitt’s main criticisms of the parliamentary system of his era—rooted in liberalism, democracy, and party politics—and his reasons for rejecting judicial or Constitutional Court oversight as a means of safeguarding the foundation. An attempt was made to understand his concept of the guardian of the foundation (or the guardian of the constitution ) more directly and precisely, without the distortions of historical accusations. The analysis focused the critiques of Carl Schmitt, the prominent German political theorist, regarding liberalism, democracy, and parliamentarism, exploring their implications for the protection of the constitution. Literature Review There have been a few Persian-language studies discussing Schmitt’s views, primarily focusing on his theory of the concept of the political. However, with regard to Schmitt’s concept of the guardian of the constitution, there is only one research titled “The Guardian of the Constitution in Carl Schmitt’s Thought” (Moradkhani, 2021), which mainly provides an exposition and descriptive account of Schmitt’s theory. In contrast, the present article aimed to critically examine Schmitt’s theoretical and fundamental critiques of liberalism, explore their implications, and present Schmitt’s alternative paradigm for safeguarding the constitution. Materials and Methods As a descriptive–analytical inquiry, this study used a library research method to offer a critical analysis of Schmitt’s constitutional theory, in particular his concept of the guardian of the constitution. Results and Discussion According to Schmitt, the foundation (or the constitution) is the manifestation of a nation with a distinct identity and of a comprehensive, all-encompassing statehood. This foundation arises from pure political processes and through political decisions, and its protection depends on specific conditions. Thus, the foundation is the very substance of the constitution, rather than the constitution itself, and cannot be safeguarded through purely legal measures. Given its inherently political nature, only an institution capable of political decision-making—and one removed from the partisan and economic conflicts of parliament and political parties—can serve as its guardian. From this perspective, Schmitt viewed the president of the Weimar Republic as a political figure who, despite being impartial in partisan and parliamentary disputes, was entrusted with safeguarding the most fundamental basis of German society and the unique identity of the German nation. Directly elected by the people, the president possessed the authority to make controversial political decisions—powers that parliament did not hold. Moreover, the protection of this foundation was so crucial that the president was expected to be willing to sacrifice everything for its continuity, including fundamental individual rights and constitutional principles of sovereignty. In his role as the guardian of the constitution, the president is therefore positioned above the constitution, exercising authority over it to protect the political existence of the nation. In Iran’s Constitution, particularly within the text of the constitution, there is an explicit reference to the protection of the constitution. One constitutional article assigns this role to the president, while another designates the Guardian Council as responsible. However, a careful examination of Schmitt’s concepts of the constitution and the guardian of the constitution reveals a significant distinction. In the Iranian constitutional system, the Guardian Council primarily serves as the guardian of the constitution. Its decades-long practice confirms that it has consistently pursued this role. In other words, the Iranian system conflates the foundation with the constitution itself, focusing on protecting the explicit, codified text from violations by other rules. While the Guardian Council was established to fulfill this function, its role is fundamentally different from Schmitt’s concept of the guardian of the constitution. Conclusion Schmitt was a staunch critic of the liberal approach to safeguarding the constitution, which he saw as lacking substantive political content and overly dependent on abstract legal principles. Instead, he advocated for a more decisive and politically charged role for the head of state, arguing that only such a figure could effectively defend the constitution during times of crisis. Schmitt’s critique was rooted in his fundamental opposition to liberal principles. He challenged the liberal notion of a neutral and objective state, contending that such a state is incapable of making the decisive political judgments necessary to protect the constitution. He also criticized liberal democracy, arguing that it produces a fragmented and indecisive political sphere, incapable of maintaining the unity and coherence of the state. Central to Schmitt’s analysis is his concept of the political , which he distinguishes from the realms of law and economics. According to Schmitt, the political is characterized by the fundamental distinction between friend and enemy—a distinction that becomes blurred and ultimately meaningless under the liberal framework. He maintained that the constitution, as the embodiment of the state’s identity, cannot be protected solely through legal mechanisms; it requires a strong and decisive political will capable of acting decisively in the face of uncertainty and conflict. Although highly controversial and widely debated, Schmitt’s ideas raise important questions about the nature of political power, the role of the state, and the mechanisms necessary for protecting the constitution in modern democratic societies.
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